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I. INTRODUCTION
Like cities across the country struggling with city-core development
growth in the 21st century, the City of Seattle needs to create more af-
fordable housing' while still increasing urban density
2 a n d  p r o v i d i n geconomic incentives to sustain private development. Lik e other rapidly
growing cities, Seattle has enacted a set of municipal laws to achieve
these competing goals. To  address Seattle's demand for affordable hous-
ing, the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) publicly manages 5,200 hous-
ing units.
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ior housing facilities and gives more than 8,300 housing choice vouchers
to low-income families! Through these efforts, the SHA's housing pro-
grams serve an estimated 26,000 people.
5 T h e  e f f o r t s  
o f  t h e  
S H A ,  
h o w -
ever, fall short o  meeting he demand for affordable housing in the city.
The SHA estimates that 8,130 households are waiting for affordable
housing units to become available.
° M o r e o v e r ,  
b e c a u s e  
7 8 %  
o f  
t h o s e
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1. See ARTHUR C. NELSON & SUSAN M. WACHTER, SMART GROWTH AND HOUSING POLICY,
available at www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf7brdi08Nelson.pdf.
2. See Amy Liu, Deputy Dir., Metro. Policy Program, Brookings Institute, Presentation at the
Delaware Valley Small Growth Alliance 2d Annual Forum 14-22 (Nov. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.brookings.eduk-imedia/Filesircispeeches/2005/1 II 7metropolitanpolicy _1M/20051117_1i
u.pdf.
3 Seattle Hous. Audi., Quick Facts (2007), httplAvww.seattlehousing.orgiaboutshai im-
agesishafacts.pdf.
4. Id. These vouchers subsidize the cost of the private rental market. Id.
5. M
6. Id
443
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receiving housing benefits have incomes well below 30% of the median
income of Seattle residents,' the SHA fails to serve thousands of resi-
dents that fall between 30% and 80% of the area median income!'
The current housing market conditions further contribute to the lack
of affordable housing units in Seattle. Housing experts have suggested
that Seattle's local economy and job growth will propel the Seattle hous-
ing market into the company of  "superstar" housing markets like the
housing markets in New York and San Francisco.
9 B e c a u s e  S e a t t l e ' smedian price for a detached home is $435,000 and its median price for a
condominium unit is $284,450, residents with incomes below or even
equal to the local per capita income struggle to find affordable hous ine
Moreover, as national mortgage financing standards have become in-
creasingly restrictive following the meltdown of the mortgage market,
fewer Seattle residents are making the jump into homeownership. " The
stall in the housing market has led to a steady increase in demand for
rental units•
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cancy rate and raise the average rental rate above its current level of
$930.
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among 100 metropolitan markets, a foreclosure bug has bitten housing
markets across the country, including large markets in  California. "
These conditions create significant challenges to low- and moderate-
income renters and purchasers, making Seattle ripe for the enactment of
an inclusionary housing plan.
7. Id In fact, the average public housing resident's income is just $12,600. Id.
8. King County Hons. Auth. Key Facts, http://www.kcha.orglaboutusikeyfacts.aspx (last vis-
ited Nov. 8, 2008). Al though the Seattle Housing Authority cannot reach many households, the
King County Housing Authority is also available to help needy households. Id. The King County
Housing Authority manages 8,636 units throughout King County and also provides rental assistance
in the form of  housing vouchers to 7,934 households. I d  The King County Housing Authority's
primary area of operations, however, is outside of the city of Seattle. Id.
9. Elizabeth Rhodes, The Housing Boom? It's Over, Realtors Told, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 14,
2007, at El, available at 2007 WLNR 22504361. In New York and San Francisco, continued desir-
ability attracts a steady stream of affluent newcomers, both American and foreign, who bring an
immense purchasing power that inflates the cost of housing for everyone. I d
10. See Elizabeth Rhodes, Real-Estate Anxiety: What's Next for Seattle in '08, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2007, at Al ,  available at 2007 WLNR 25723249; Elizabeth Rhodes, Home Prices Shp to
'06 Level, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at Al ,   available at 2007 WLNR 24188078. The current
median income in Seattle is $46,356. Id.
11. Elizabeth Rhodes, Winds of  Change, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at El , available at
2007 WLNR 25728651.
12. M
13. Id The current average is an 8.6% increase from 2006. I d
14. Elizabeth Rhodes, Seattle Foreclosure Activity Up, But Still Much Lower Than Much of
Nation, sEATTLE TIMES, July 25, 2008, at DI, available at 2008 WLNR 13911810; see also Realty
Track, http://www.realtytrac.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2008) (enter "QuickSearch" o f  Seattle,
Wash.). Al though the numbers change daily, there were 1,148 properties in Seattle either up for
auction or held by a bank as of November 7, 2008. Id.
2009] R e s p o n s i b l e  Development? 4 4 5
This Comment explores how Seattle's enactment of a limited inclu-
sionary housing plan can effectively meet the challenges of responsible
development, both satisfying the city's need for density and affordability
and maintaining an economic environment conducive to developer prof-
itability." Although Seattle's current inclusionary housing plan may
give adequate incentives to developers, the city needs to move away
from its current voluntary plan and toward a mandatory plan that bal-
ances increasing developer incentives with a demand for affordable on-
site development to serve a broader spectrum of income levels.
Part II of this Comment lays out the background of exclusionary
and inclusionary zoning laws, which form the foundation of every mod-
em inclusionary housing plan. Part III examines the different approaches
taken by the cities of Seattle, San Francisco, and Denver within the in-
clusionary housing framework. Finally , Part IV proposes several rec-
ommendations that will enhance the effectiveness of Seattle's inclusion-
ary housing plan.
EXCLUSIONARY AND INCLUSIONARY ZONING
A. Exclusionary Zoning
Exclusionary zoning laws bar certain populations from particular
communities. Initially , cities enacted exclusionary zoning laws to limit
the kinds of buildings constructed on private lands in order to slow popu-
lation increases during the early 20th century.
16 D u r i n g  t h i s  
e r a ,  t h e  
S u -
preme Court recognized a municipality's authority to divide land for spe-
cific uses as a full extension of the state police power." Land use policy
makers have since enjoyed considerable autonomy in determining the
kind of  zoning laws that best fi t the needs o f  their municipalities."
15. The concept of responsible development can be contrasted with the broader-based concept
of smart growth that includes more direct environmental concerns that are beyond the scope of this
article. For  a discussion of the broad-based concept of smart-growth that encompasses community
planning and discourse, as well as the environment, see Tim Iglesias, A Place to Call Home? Afford-
able Housing Issues in America Article Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Afforda-
bility, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511,573
-
82 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ;  
P a t r i c i a  
E .  
S a l l d n ,  
F r o m  
E u c l i d  
t o  
G r o w i
n g
Smart: The Transformation of the American Local Land Use Ethic into Local Land Use and Envi-
ronmental Controls, 20 PACE ENVI'L. L. REV. 109,117-26 (2002). I n  this Comment, responsible
development refers to a city's successful balancing of density and affordability across a broad spec-
trum of socio-economic levels with continued developer profitability.
16. Ken Zimmerman 8c Arielle Cohen, Exclusionary Zoning: Constitutional and Federal Statu-
tory Responses, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 40-41 (Tim Igle-
sias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2005). Exclusionary zoning laws also served to limit the kinds of
activities that could be carried out on private lands. Id.
17. Id; VIII. of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365,395 (1926).
18. Zimmerman & Cohen, supra note 16, at 41.
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Widespread zoning techniques, however, have also succeeded in barring
access to certain communities by certain types of people.
19 Exclusionary zoning laws, both purposely and inadvertently, have
excluded disadvantaged groups, such as minorities or low- and moderate-
income citizens, from certain areas.
m T o d a y ,  
e x c l u s i o n a r y  
r e s i d e n t i
a l
zoning policies are no longer based explicitly on racial classifications or
income levels; instead, exclusionary residential zoning policies regulate
standard residential uses. 21 Yet ,  the seemingly neutral regulation o f
standard residential uses produces the same exclusionary effect as earlier
zoning laws based explicitly on race or income leve1.
22 Although cities may no longer purposefully enact an exclusionary
housing ordinance, modem zoning requirements may nonetheless effec-
tively exclude all but the rich by restricting the development of smaller,
affordable residences and promoting the development of larger single-
family residences. 23 Moreover, because a large percentage o f  low-
income households are also minority households, exclusionary ordi-
nances raise issues of racial and ethnic segregation.
24 Although courts have invalidated some exclusionary zoning laws,
many o f  these laws have subsisted.
25 L e g i s l a t i v e  
d e f e r e n c e  
a n d  
t h e
standing requirement pose particular barriers to challenging exclusionary
19. Id
20. Id.
21. 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR. ET AL., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §
22.3 (4th ed. 2007).
22. Id; see also Zimmerman & Cohen, supra note 16, at 41. For  example, zoning require-
ments that are benign on their face—such as minimum lot size requirements, minimum and maxi-
mum building sizes, restrictions on the number of bedrooms, minimum floor areas, street frontage
requirements, the prohibition of mobile homes, or the exclusion of multi-family development—may
harm low- and moderate-income persons seeking housing. Id.
23. See HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN HOUSING, LAND USE, AND
PLANNING LAW 52, 54-55 (Richard P. Fishman ed., Ballinger Publ'g 1978) [hereinafter HOUSING
FOR ALL]. Lim i ting development to single-family dwellings allows a municipality to eliminate
realistic housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income persons because single-family housing
is more expensive than multi-family housing. Id. Multi- family housing is cheaper because of the
increased density and decreased unit size achieved by larger apartment buildings. Id. Raising the
unit size requirement results in larger units within the zoned area, making them proportionally more
expensive to build, and pricing low- and moderate-income residents out of the community. Id.
24. J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Exclusionary Zoning, 48 A.L.R.3d 1210 § I [a] (1973).
25. Id. §§ I  [b], 2 (when the courts find a reasonable connection between zoning restrictions
and the public health or safety of a community the exclusionary zoning regulation has been upheld
as being within the traditional scope of police powers that enable municipalities to regulate and
restrict land use for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, or general welfare of the
community); but see Isla Verde 1nel Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash. 2d 740, 758, 765,
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subdivision as open space violated the exclusionary language of WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 as a
prohibited charge).
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zoning laws.
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be valid and constitutional under the doctrine of legislative deference, a
court will uphold the law unless the litigant can show its unconstitution-
ality by clear and convincing evidence.
27 S e c o n d ,  t o  
h a v e  
s t a n d i n g  
t o
challenge an exclusionary zoning law, a litigant must show that she has
been "aggriev d."
28 Litigants have occasionally succeeded in challenging exclusionary
zoning laws.
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Court held that a municipality could not presumptively foreclose housing
opportunities for low- and moderate-income residents; rather, the mu-
nicipality must affirmatively afford those residents housing opportuni-
ties.
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municipality to make deals with developers at the time of development,
rather than applying predefined zoning regulations to the project.
31 A s  aresult, most of the residential projects developed under the agreements
were for single-family occupancy, making the bulk of the available hous-
ing beyond the financial reach of low- and moderate-income families.
32For example, the municipality limited apartments to one-bedroom and
limited the number of child-inhabitants.
33 T h r o u g h  
t h e s e  
s c h e m e s ,  
t h e
rental and sales prices were pricing low- and moderate-income residents
out of the municipality.
34 After th  municipality failed to institute any changes to afford low-
and moderate-income households the opportunity to get housing, Mount
Laurel II  was initiated to enforce the court's earlier judgment." In  Mt.
Laurel II, the court noted that no lower-income housing units had been
built since Mt. Laurel L
36 T h e  
c o u r t  
e x p l i c i t
l y  
s p e c i
fi e d  
t w
o  
a c t
i o n
s  
m
u
-
26. Kemper, supra note 24, § 2. A  litigant must generally have a legal or equitable interest in
the disputed property to pursue a claim. I d
27. Id * 3(a).
28. I d *  2.
29. See, e.g., S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mt. Laurel 1), 336 A.2d
713 (NJ. 1975); S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mt. Laurel 11), 456 A l d
390 (NJ. 1983).
30. Mt. Laurel !, 336 A l d at 724-25. The decision in Mt. Laurel 1 came to be known as the
Mt. Laurel Doctrine.
31. Id. at 720. This kind of land use planning is commonly referred to as Planned Unit Devel-
opment (PUD).
32. i d at 721-22.
33. Id The municipality required developers to record a covenant stating that the developer
would pay for the increased financial burden associated with the public school enrollment of chil-
dren living in that residential development if, on average, there were more than 0.3 school-age chil-
dren per unit developed. I d
34. Id
35. Mt. Laurel 11, 456 A.2d at 390, 461.
36. Id
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nicipalities would need to take to achieve the required housing result:
first, institute mandatory set-asides o f  units for  low- and moderate-
income persons within a given development and second, offer general
incentive zoning that gives developers density bonuses to increase devel-
opment density in exchange for affordable housing.
37 T h i s  h o l d i n g  
e v e n -
tually evolved into the fair share doctrine that requires a municipality to
show that it has provided for the creation of low- and moderate-income
housing_
38 The Mt. Laurel decisions have lasting importance for two reasons.
First, at least in New Jersey, the decisions allowed trial courts to maneu-
ver around the long-standing policy of legislative deference by giving the
courts the authority to revise a municipality's zoning ordinances.
39 S e c -ond, several states followed New Jersey's lead by enacting statutes forc-
ing municipalities to provide their fair share of lower income hous ine
Washington is one of the states that followed the principles articu-
lated in Mt. Laurel. Washington's Growth Management Act of  1990
(GMA) requires larger municipalities to create a comprehensive growth
plan that identifies policies to satisfy a municipality's housing needs
across income levels." This  growth plan requirement, however, is lim-
ited. T he  requirement does not explicitly state the guidelines under
which a municipality would need to achieve a proper balance of housing.
Furthermore, it does not specifically reference the fair share doctrine set
forth in the Mt. Laurel H decision.
42 Despite the absence of a direct reference to the Mt. Laurel deci-
sions, Mt. Laurel's impact on Washington's development and housing
strategies is evident from the housing element in the GMA.
43 T h e  h o u s -ing element requires m nicipalities to establish goals for the develop-
ment of housing, identify sufficient land for housing, and make adequate
provisions for projected housing needs." These requirements strongly
suggest that the Mt. Laurel decisions have affected the development pol-
icy of Washington,
45 a s  
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a s  
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t i e s .
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37. Id. at 445-47.
38. Id. at 422.
39. Timothy Overton, Comment, Empty Laws Make for Empty Stomachs: Hollow Public Hous-
ing Laws in Utah and Other Slates Force the Nation's Poor to Choose Between Adequate Housing
and Life's Other Necessities, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 495, 507 (2007).
40. Pennsylvania and New York also have taken a constitutionally derived skepticism to exclu-
sionary housing. See Zimmerman & Cohen, supra note 16, at 63-72.
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(2) (2006); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 365-195-310 (2006).
42. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(2).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id; see also Zimmerman, & Cohen, supra note 16, at 63-72.
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B. Inclusionaly Zoning
In the early 1970s, in response to the decrease in affordable housing
stemming from exclusionary zoning laws, municipalities began enacting
inclusionary zoning laws:
47 T o d a y ,  
z o n i n g  
l a w s  
a r e  
g e n e r
a l l y  
a  
p r o
d u c
t
of both legisl tion at the state and local levels and, to a lesser extent, ju-
dicial decisions like Mt. Laurel I  & H .
48 I n i t i a l l y ,  
i n c l u s i o n a r y  
z o n i n g
was neither voluntary nor triggered by incentives:
49 M a n d a t o r y  
i n c l u -
sio ary zo ing was seen as necessary because the Mt. Laurel decisions
and other early studies showed that developers were unlikely to partici-
pate in voluntary programs.
5° A f t e r ,  
h o w e v e r ,  
t h e  
V i r g i n
i a  
S u p r
e m e
Court invalidated a county's mandatory inclusionary zoning law in 1973,
other municipaliti s broadened their inclusionary zoning laws to include
both mandatory and voluntary plans.
51 Today, inclusionary zoning laws fall into one of three broad catego-
ries: ( I)  set-asides, (2) density bonus programs, or (3) hybrids of  the
two.
52 
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amount of lower-income housing into a particular development.
53 T h i sminimum ranges from 5% to 25% of a total development and can be ei-
ther mandatory or voluntary.
54 I n  
c o n t r a s t ,  
d e n s i t y  
b o n u s  
p r o g r
a m s  
a r
e
voluntary programs that give developers the opportunity to increase the
density of a multi-family project in exchange for a certain allocation of
affordable housing units.
55 F i n a l l y ,  
a s  
a  
r e s u l t  
o f  
i n c r e
a s e d  
c r e a t
i v i t y  
i
n
drafting i clusionary zoning laws, municipalities now employ hybrid
plans alongside set-asides and density bonus programs.
56 T h e s e  h y b r i dplans recognize the problems associated with developing lower-income
47. Peter Salsich, State and Local Regulation Promoting Affordable Housing, in THE LEGAL
GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 16, at 89. I n  1971, a few years before
the Mt. Laurel decisions, Fairfax County, Virginia, installed a program, and Montgomery County,
Maryland, followed suit in 1973. Id. Since that time, California has been the largest proponent of
inclusionary zoning, with over 100 municipalities adopting inclusionary zoning ordinances. Id.
48. Id. at 89-91; see also HOUSING FOR ALL, supra note 23, at 584.
49. Salsich, supra note 47, at 90.
50. Id.
51. HOUSING FOR ALL, supra note 23, at 198. I n  Bd. of  Supervisors of Fairfax County v. De-
Groff Enters., 198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973), the court struck down Fairfax County's mandatory inclu-
sionary zoning ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance was beyond the authority granted to the
county under the state enabling act, and would therefore constitute a "taking" of private property.
Id.
52. Salsich, supra note 47, at 92, 95.
53. Id.
54. Voluntary programs are most successful in housing markets that are strong enough that
developers will be able to fund and include below market rate units in a project in exchange for an
increase in density levels. See id. at 90.
55. Id.
56. See 2 ZIEGLER ET AL., supra note 21, *22.23.
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housing and offer alternatives to on-site construction, including off-site
constmction.
57 
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tions of land for lower-income housing or cash payments in lieu of im-
mediate development.
58 M o d e m  
i n c l u s i o
n a r y  
h o u s
i n g  
p r o g
r a m
s  
p r o
v i d
e
for municipal oversight, not only to set proper unit sale and rental prices
at the outset, but also to monitor the units to ensure continued afforda-
bility .
59 Regardless of whether an inclusionary program is categorized as a
set-aside, density bonus, or a hybrid of the two, the program should ad-
dress (1) the minimum unit threshold at which a project will trigger the
inclusionary ordinance; (2) the percentage of units within a project that
must be affordable; (3) the segment of the population that will be eligible
for the affordable units; and (4) the time during which the units will re-
main affordable
° Inclusionary zoning laws that successfully address these issues have
several socioeconomic benefits.
61 F i r s t ,  
i n c l u s i o n a r y  
z o n i n g  
a l l o w
s  
a f -
fordable housing to be developed within larger market-rate develop-
ments, creating economically diverse communities.
62 S e c o n d ,  i n c l u s i o n -ary zoning enables low- and moderate-income residents to live near
where they work, which creates more density, reduces displacement of
lower-income residents as new market-rate development is created, and
diversifies the workforce. 63 Finally , inclusionary zoning encourages
community members to embrace the idea of affordable housing by pro-
viding economic incentives. Developing buildings that are constructed
entirely of low-income units often creates anxiety amongst community
members who fear that affordable housing will increase crime
64 a n d  s t u n tproperty values.
65 
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clusionary zoning laws nonetheless mitigate the opposition to affordable
57. 2 Id.
58. 2 Id. The in-lieu fees are pooled to finance construction of affordable units at a later date.
2 Id.
59. 2 Id.
60. Salsich, supra note 47, at 90.
61. See CAL. COAL. FOR RURAL Boos. & NON-PROFIT HOos. Assoc. OF NORTHERN CAL.,
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA: 30 YEARS OF INNOVATION 3 (2003), http://www.oakland
netcom/BlueRibbonCotmnission/PDFS/BlueRibbon I 0-NPH.pdf.
62. Id
63. See id. Shi fting the financial burden of creating affordable housing onto developers also
enables municipalities to devote their resources to other capital improvement projects. Id.
M. Mary Lynne Vellinga, Natomas Crime Wave Raises Concerns About Affordable Housing,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 22, 2008, at 8A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/101/story/1099213
.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
65. Angie Basiouny, Affordable Housing Effort Upsets Neighbors, NEWS J., Sept. 15, 2008,
http://www.delawareonline.comlapps/pbcs.dlI!article?AID=/200809 I 5/NEWS02/809150338 ( l a s t
visited Nov. 9, 2008).
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housing by combining affordable units with market-rate units and, thus,
decrease the social and economic costs of convincing community mem-
bers to accept affordable housing.
66 Despite these socioeconomic benefits, passing the economic costs
of inclusionary housing plans entirely onto developers, although appeal-
ing to municipalities, significantly affects the feasibility of  these pro-
grams.
° 
F o r  
e x
a m
p l e
,  
d e
v e
l o
p e
r s  
o
f
t
e
n  
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e  
t
h
e  
s
a
l
e  
o
r  
r
e
n
t
a
l  
p
r
i
c
e
s
for market-rate units in the newly constructed buildings to offset the re-
duced or negative return on the inclusionary units.
68 A s  t h e  p r i c e s  
r i s e ,
market-rate purchasers and renters become less likely to enter the mar-
ket, in turn d feating the general goal of inclusionary zoning: the creation
of affordable housing units through the development o f  market-rate
units.
69 To reduce the costs of  inclusionary zoning, some municipalities
have granted developers incentives. Munic ipal incentives relax certain
zoning restrictions in return for a developer's agreement to build a speci-
fied number of lower-income units." The underlying theory is that the
additional profit generated by constructing bonus market-rate units will
offset the lost revenue associated with constructing affordable housing
units?' Other incentives include the waiver of  building permit proc-
essing fees, expedition of permit plan review, and exemption from utility
hookup charges.
72
66. See AFFIRMED Hous. GROUP, MYTHS AND STEREOTYPES ABOUT AFFORDABLE HOUSING
1-3 (2004) , http://www.affirmedhousing.com/resources/pdf/myths_stereotypes.pdf. Affordable
housing has been shown to have no impact on the property values of surrounding buildings or units
and, in fact, can actually raise property values. Id. at 1. Moreover, by helping to maintain a stable
population affordable housing can actually help to reduce crime rates. Id. at 3.
67 CHRIS FISCELLI, NEW APPROACHES TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING: OVERVIEW OF THE
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY PROBLEM 3 (Reason Found. 2005), http://reason.org/update20_affordable
housing.pdf. The potential loss of money by developers is the one factor that affects the viability of
an inclusionary housing plan. I d  I f  the costs are high enough to deter a developer from undertaking
a building opportunity, then as a corollary, the number of inclusionary units that are built is summa-
rily reduced. Id.
68. M at 4.
69. See id. at 4. Even i f the developer raises the prices of market-rate units or absorbs the cost
of building affordable units, i t may still run into problems marketing the full-price units because of
the perception that the value of the market-rate units is reduced because of their proximity to the
affordable units.
70.2 ZIEGLER ET AL., supra note 21.
71. See 2 id. For  example, under incentive zoning, a developer who could normally only build
a 100-unit development may be permitted to build an additional twenty-five units i f a certain number
are reserved as affordable. See 2 id.
72. See 2 id.
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III. INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PLANS
Although incentive-based plans appear economically efficient, they
have not been entirely successful in practice. This  Part examines how
inclusionary zoning laws (or "inclusionary housing plans") have been
implemented in Seattle, San Francisco, and Denver.
A. Seattle
1. 1989 CAP Initiative
In May of 1989, Seattle citizens passed Initiative 31, the Citizens
Alternative Plan ("CAP") Initiative." To slow growth in Seattle, CAP
placed a limit on building heights throughout the c ity
74 a n d  p l a c e d  a  
c e i l -
ing on the amount of offic  space built in a given year." Unfortunately,
CAP was a homegrown movement driven more by neighborhood activ-
ism than by level-headed planning.
76 T o  t h a t  
e n d ,  
t h e  
n e w  
d e n s i t y  
r e g u -
lations established under the plan were ill advised.
77 E x p e r t s  n o w  
a g r e e
that CAP erroneously tra sferred the power over zoning matters from
elected officials and city planners to city residents."
Although CAP focused primarily on commercial development, it
affected residential growth by limiting new building heights to 85 feet in
areas that could have benefited from new multi-family development.
79CAP also required developers to scale back mixed-use projects designed
to incorporate housing.
8° F o r  
e x a m p l e ,  
t h e  
fi r s t  
p r o j
e c t  
a p p r
o v e d  
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r
CAP was a ten-story, 250,000-square-foot building developed by Martin
73. See Walter Hatch, Voters Put a Lid on It: CAP Winners Savor the Message Sent to City
Hall, SEATFLE TIMES, May 17, 1989, at Al . Sixty-two percent of the citizens who participated in
the special election approved the measure. Id. The CAP initiative was part of a larger response by
disgruntled citizens to change the approach City Hall had taken to increased multi-family develop-
ment in traditional single-family neighborhoods. Id.
74. Walter Hatch, Questions and Answers about the CAP, SEATTLE TIMES, May I, 1989, at A9.
Specifically, CAP restricted building heights to 450 feet in the downtown financial district, 300 feet
in the districts north and east of the financial district, and from 240 to 400 feet in the retail district.
Id.
B3.
77. Id. Density is measured by floor-area-ratio ("FAR"), which represents the ratio between
the square footage of a building and the square footage of the lot. I d  CAP effectively reduced the
allowable FAR from 20 to 14 in the financial district and from 14 to 10 in other downtown districts.
Id.
75. M
76. Walter Hatch, Foes Pan New Plan to Control Growth, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 17, 1989, at
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Terry Lawhead, Panel OK 's Selig Building Downtown, Project First to Face CAP
Scrutiny, SEATME TIMES, Dec. 7, 1989, at DI.
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Selig." The original design called for a fifty-story, mixed-use building
composed of both condominium units and office space.
82 B e c a u s e  C A Plimited the number of  allowable square feet for the entire downtown
area, however, the developer scaled back the building before its ap-
proval, and, as a result, all of the housing units were los t.
83 T h u s ,  a l -though CAP purported to control growth, it accelerated urban sprawl as
developers fanned out to the suburbs, causing a loss of housing in the
downtown core."
Less than twenty years later, some previously staunch proponents
of CAP now support the new City Development Plan enacted in April of
2006.
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tions a "milestone" and "turning point" in the history of development in
Seattle.
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opment and residents to downtown Seattle, which will in turn help curb
urban sprawl."
2. 2006 Legislative Changes
In response to the increased growth in population, the City of Seat-
tle enacted the Downtown Livability Legislation in 2006, which aimed to
enhance livability and increase the range of housing available in down-
town Seattle.
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-
opers could build taller and denser buildings, the city promulgated a vi-
sion of a new urban landscape that would entice residents to move to the
81. Id
82. M
83. Id The Seattle Downtown Project Review Panel approved the reduced project. Id. Under
CAP, only 500,000 square feet of office space could be built in a given year between Denny Way
and South Dearborn Street, severely restricting mixed use projects such as the original Selig project.
Id.
84. See Bob Young, Highrise Boom Coming to Seattle? Council Votes to Allow Taller Build-
ings Developers Have Plans in Hand. Including 2 Condo Towers Near Pike Place Market, SEATTLE
TmotE8, Apr. 4, 2006, at Bl . See also Ken Murakami, Next Step for Growth: The Denny Triangle?
Schell, Sims Have a Plan to Revitalize Neighborhood, Protect More Rural Areas, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1998, at Al ; Ken i Murakami, Going Up? Maybe Skyline Should, Say Former Foes, Shifts in
Attitude Mirrors Change in Growing Seattle, SEATTLE P O S T
-
I N T E L L I G E N C E R ,  M a r .  
6 ,  2 0 0 1 ,  
a t  A l .
The reduction in building heights, FARs, and developable space in the downtown core also forced
many lower-wage workers to flee the city in search for  cheaper housing, contributing to urban
sprawl and increased commute times.
85. See Young, supra note 84.
86. Former Seattle City Councilman Peter Steinbrueck was a proponent of CAP but has been
more recently the chief architect behind the new City Development Plan. I d
87.Id
88. Press Release, City of Seattle Mayor's Office, Mayor Signs Historic Bill for Livable, Af-
fordable City Center (Apr. 12, 2006), available at  http://www.ci.seattle.wa.usinewsidetail.asp?
1D=6046&Dept-40 (last visited Oct. 16, 2008). The legislation was also a response to calls from the
downtown neighborhoods for more downtown jobs and housing. Id.
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downtown core, slow urban sprawl, and create more jobs near where
people lived.
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ists and city council members was the promise that this legislation would
generate more affordable housing in downtown Seattle."
More specifically, the city promised affordable housing worth $100
illion for city purchasers with incomes of up to 100% of the median
income' Renters in Seattle generally qualify for lower-income housing
i f  their annual income does not exceed 80% of the median household
income for the c ity .
92 I f  t h e  
m e d i a
n  
i n c o
m e  
f o
r  
a  
o n e -
p e r s
o n  
h o u
s e h
o l d
were $57,000, th n, to qualify for  subsidized housing, a one-person
household with an income of $45,600 could spend no more than $1,140
per month to rent a studio unit and no more than $1,221 per month to
rent a one-bedroom unit.
93 B e c a u s e  
t h e  
D o w n t o
w n  
L i v a b i
l i t y  
L e g i
s l a -
tion set the income ceiling for homebuyers at 100% o f  the median
household income, the legislation reached out to more residents in need
f affordable housing in downtown Seattle.
94 The affordable housing section of the Downtown Livability Legis-
lation, as codified under the Seattle Municipal Code, gives residential
developers the opportunity to increase the height of buildings under con-
struction in several of the downtown core zones in exchange for afford-
able housing commitments.
95 T o  
f a c i l i t a t e  
t h e  
d u a l  
g o a l
s  
o f  
m a r k e
t - r a t e
development and increased affordable housing, the city turned to an in-
clusionary housing plan.
96 M o r e  
s p e c i fi c a l l
y ,  
t h e  
c i t
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f o
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v o l
u n -
tary plan that applies to three zoning designations used in the downtown
89. Id
90. Id;  see also Seattle Office of Hous., Downtown Residential Bonus Program, http://www.
seattle.govihousing/incentiv s/residential_bonus.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
91. M
92. Id
93. Id These limits are published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) during the first quarter of each year. Id.
94. Housing experts recommend that citizens devote no more than 30% of their annual income
to housing. I d  This recommendation applies to both renters and purchasers. Id.
95. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, *  49.015 (2006), available at http://clerk.ci.
seattlema.usi—publietcodelltm (enter 23.49.015); id. § 49.008, available at http://clerk.ci.seattle.
wa.ust--publicicodelltm (enter 23.49.008); id. §  49.020, available at  http://clerk.ci•seattlema.
us/-.public/codel .htm (enter 23.49.020).
96. Id § 49.015. Under  the old zoning code, building heights in the old DMC zones had a
maximum height of 290'. Under  the revamped code provisions, however, a developer can either
choose to build to the old maximum height (which is now the base height) or up to a maximum of
400' in additional bonus height. Id. Similarly, whereas projects zoned DOC-1 had an old maximum
height of 450', those projects can now be constructed to an unlimited building height. Id. Finally,
DOC-2 building projects had an old maximum building height of 300', whereas now those buildings
can soar to 500'. I d
2009] R e s p o n s i b l e  Development? 4 5 5
core and nearby areas: Downtown Office Core-1 (DOC-1), Downtown
Office Core-2 (DOC-2), and Downtown Mixed Commercial (DMC).
97 Within this voluntary scheme, a developer may pursue either a per-
formance option or a payment option.
98 I f  t h e  
d e v e l o p e r  
d e t e r m i n e s  
t h a t
the project requir s bonus area, it executes a Voluntary Agreement with
the city, whereby the developer promises to provide low- or moderate-
income housing via either the performance option or the payment op-
tion.
99 The performance option allows developers to construct taller build-
ings in exchange for reserving 11% of  the net residential floor area
sought as bonus development for low- or moderate-income housing.
looThe developer must either incorporate the units in the particular project
being built or provide the units within one block of the main project
site!'"
The following example illustrates the application o f  this option.
Developer A proposes a new thirty-nine-story apartment tower in a DMC
2407290'-400
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plan calling for half the units to be constructed as studios and half as one-
bedroom apartments.
m3 
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floor area sought by the developer is 131,700 square feet.
w4 T o  c o m p u t ethe net fl or area that must be reserved as affordable housing, the gross
floor area of 131,700 square feet is multiplied by an efficiency factor of
80%,
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97. Id § 49.015(B). The legislation allows a developer to elect to seek bonus development for
projects in DOC-1 (base height of 450'—unlimited with density bonus), DOC-2 (base height of 300
'-500' with density bonus), or DMC zones (base height of 290'-400' with density bonus) in ex-
change for either reserving 11% of the net bonus residential floor area sought or the payment of $10
per square foot of net bonus residential floor area between the height of 85 feet and the base height;
$15 per square foot on the first four floors above the base height; $20 per square foot for the next
three floors; and $25 per square foot for the remaining floors up to the building height maximum, not
to exceed $18.94 per square foot for the net residential floor area sought as bonus development in
DMC zones. See id The rate for DOC-1 and DOC-2 zones is $18.94 per square foot of net residen-
ial floor area sought above the base height. See id.
98. M
99. Id § 49.015(A)(2). The Voluntary Agreement is recorded before the city issues the master
use permit, which gives bonus development approval for the project. Id. § 49.015(B)(3)(ii). Under
the Voluntary Agreement, all units provided under the bonus program must remain affordable for
fifty years. I d  § 49.015(B)(2).
100. Id. § 49.015(B)(1)(a).
101. Id
102. See id The base height is 290' with an achievable height of 400'.
103. Id.
104. Id The area between 290' and 400' plus the area between 85' and 240' that exceeds the
allowable base floor area.
105. See id The efficiency factor accounts for the amount of space in every project that is not
livable, such as square footage lost to stairwells, elevator shafts, insulation, and framing. Id.
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percent of net floor area would then have been reserved as affordable, for
a total of 11,590 square feet.
m6 B e c a u s e  
t h e  
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n g  
u n i t
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n
be small r than the market-rate units, based on a 600-square-foot apart-
ment configuration, twenty affordable units would be created for inclu-
sion in the development.
m7 T h e  
m a x i m u m  
h o u s e h
o l d  
i n c o
m e  
a
t  
i n i t
i a l
occupancy is 80% of the median income for the city, which means that a
developer may charge $1,140 for a studio unit, depending on the renter's
actual household s ize.
1
"
In lieu of  the performance option, a developer may exercise the
payment option. Rather than keeping 11% of the net bonus square foot-
age for on-site development, the developer pays a fee based on the
square footage of the desired bonus area above the base building height
into an affordable housing pool!"  The city then uses the amounts con-
tributed to the housing pool to fund affordable low-income housing.
1113A recently approved project in Seattle illustrates this option. OPUS
NWR Development, L.L.C., is developing a thirty-eight-floor, 400-foot
luxury condominium tower near Seattle's Pike Place Market." The
building is located in a DMC 2 4 0 ' / 2 9 0
1
- 4 0 0 '  z o n e ,  
m e a n i n g  
t h a t  
n o r -
mally the developer would have to pay into the city's affordable housing
pool for all net residential square feet between 290' and 400.
112 B e c a u s e ,how ver, the project calls for floor plates that are larger than allowable
on floors below the base height, OPUS must also pay for 17,430 gross
square feet of  bonus area up to the base height, equal to $139,440.
113Once the base height has been achieved, OPUS must contribute an
amount of $15 per square foot for the first four floors beyond the base
height, $20 per square foot for the next three floors, and $25 per square
106. Id. § 49.015B(1)(a).
107. See id § 49.015B(b)(8). Twenty units are created when the total square feet is divided by
a 600 square foot unit size: 11,590/600 = 19.3 (rounded to 20).
108. Seattle Office of Hous., supra note 90.
109. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, § 49.015(B)(b). I f  the developer wants to avoid
accruing interest, it must remit payment when the building permit is issued; alternatively, the devel-
oper may delay payment until the first certificate of occupancy is issued, at which point the total sum
plus interest accrued from the date of the permit issuance is due. I d  § 49.015(C)(2).
110. Id. § 49.015(C)(2).
111. Letter from William Justen, Managing Dir., Real Estate, Samis Found., to Laura Hewitt-
Walker, Strategic Advisor, Seattle Office of Hous. (Aug. 7, 2006).
112. Id; see SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, § 49.008.
113. See id § 49.015B(1)(a). A  floor plate refers to the total square footage per floor. The
plates in the OPUS project are larger than allowed on floors 7 through 28, and therefore, the devel-
oper must pay for the additional bonus floor area of about 830 square feet per floor. There are twen-
ty-one floors between the 85' and the 290' base height. Thus, when the 17,430 gross square feet is
multiplied by the efficiency factor of 80% and then multiplied by the $10 per square foot fee there is
$139,440 due ((17,430 x .8)10) from OPUS for the floors from 85' to the 290' base height. Letter
from William Justen to Laura Hewitt-Walker, supra note I l l .
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foot for all remaining floors.
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from OPUS is $1,751,000.
115 A l t h o u g h  
t h e  
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nus area fluctuated by floor, it averaged $17.97 per net square foot, less
han the maximum allowable charge of $18.94 per net square foot.
I16 Commercial office and hotel developments are also tied to a city
program that seeks to generate affordable housing.
117 T h e  c o m m e r c i a lprogram is similar to the residential bonus program because a developer
may elect to build taller in exchange for building affordable housing off-
site or making a payment into the affordable housing pool.'" A t  the
same time, the commercial program is also different in three regards.
First, the city calculates the bonus square footage using the base and
maximum floor-area-mtios
119 s e t  f o r  
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p a r t i c u l a r  
z o n e .  
I N  
S e c o
n d ,  
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e
city charges a developer a variable rate per square foot, which is tied to
designated low- and moderate-incomes levels .
121 F i n a l l y ,  i n  
a d d i t i o n  
t o
requiring commercial developers to contribute a maximum of $18.75 per
net bonus square fo t for housing, the city requires developers to con-
tribute $3.25 per square foot for childcare, resulting in a total payment of
$22 per square foot.
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114. The next four floors above the 290' base height (floors 29-32) are assessed a $15 per
square foot bonus surcharge ((43,320 x .8)15 = $519,840). Floors 22 through 35 are assessed a $20
per square foot bonus surcharge ((32,490 x .8)20 = $519,840). T he top three floors (36-38) are
assessed a $25 per square foot bonus surcharge ((28,594 x .8)25 = $571,880). Letter  from William
Justen to Laura Hewitt-Walker, supra note 111.
115.M
116. SEATTLE, WAsH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, § 49.015B(b)(2)(i) (2006); Letter from William
Justen to Laura Hewitt-Walker, supra note 111.
117. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, § 49.012, available at http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/
—public/codelltm (enter 23.49.012).
118. Id § 49.012(A)(2).
119. See discussion supra note 77.
120. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, § 49.011, available at http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/
—public/codelltm (enter 23.49.011).
121. Id § 49.012(A), available at http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.usi—public/codel.htm (enter 23.49.0
12; scroll to (h); click 23.49.012(A)). Although the payments vary depending on whether the hous-
ing is affordable for those citizens with incomes at 30% below median, 50% below median, or 80%
below median, the developer will never pay more than $18.75 per square foot for the bonus space
sought. I d
122. Seattle Office of Hous., Downtown Commercial Bonus Program, http://www.seattle.gov/
housing/incentives/Commercial_bonusltm (last visited Nov. 8, 2008). For  example, i f a developer
seeks to develop a 30,000-square-foot site in a DOC-2 zone up to a FAR of 9, the amount required
under the payment option would be calculated as follows. See id. A  base FAR of 5 multiplied by
the site size yields a commercial floor area allowed outright of 150,000 square feet (5 x 30,000). See
id. The total commercial floor area the developer is seeking is 270,000 square feet (9 x 30,000). See
id Thus, the bonus floor area above the base FAR is 120,000 square feet, and the total bonus pay-
ment toward housing, assuming there are not any other bonuses, would be $2,250,000 (120,000
square feet x $18.75 per square foot). I d  Moreover, the total developer payment toward childcare
would be $390,000 (120,000 square feet x $3.25). Id.  See also SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit.
23, § 49.012.
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2007, developers have contributed about $8 million to the affordable
housing pool and $1.1 million for childcare through the program.
123 In contrast, in about a year and a half, the newer residential bonus
program has brought in about $570,000.
124 A n  a d d i t i o n a l  
$ 1 , 7 5 1 , 0 0 0  
i s
due from the OPUS project upon the issuance of the first certificate of
occupancy.125 O f  the forty-two current residential or mixed residential
projects in the pipeline within either DMC or DOC zones, however, only
three projects have entered into Voluntary Agreements.
126 A l t h o u g h  o n eadditional project appears to have plans for bonus space, and ten other
projects could potentially seek bonus height at some point, none of the
developers behind these projects have made an affirmative commitment
by signing Voluntary Agreements.
I27 E v e n  
a s s u m i n g  
t h a t  
t h e s e  
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p -
ers do sign Voluntary Agreements, they will likely delay payment until
fter the city issues the certificate of occupancy, making it difficult to
estimate how much money is in the pipeline for affordable housing unit
construction. I n  contrast to the meager numbers produced thus far by
Seattle's plan, San Francisco's inclusionary housing plan has seen great-
er success in creating affordable housing units by rejecting a voluntary
plan.
B. San Francisco
California requires that each local government develop a compre-
hensive long-term general plan establishing policies for future develop-
ment.
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123. Laura Hewitt-Walker, Seattle Office of  Hous., Developer Contributions (2007) (unpub-
lished spreadsheet of developer contributions) (on file with author). Seven projects have participated
in the program, with the single largest contribution coming from the new Washington Mutual Tower
II project, which achieved an additional 150,000 square feet in exchange for a contribution of $2.8
million into the fund. Payments under the current ordinance all stem from the development of pro-
jects between 2004 and 2007. Id
124. Condo Conversions and Other Tenant Displacements in Washington State, WSHFC
NEWSLETIER (Wash. State Hous. Fin. Comm'n, Seattle, Wash.), Oct. 2007, at 11, available at
http://www.wshfc.org/News1etter/Oct2007/print.pdf.
125. Letter from William Justen to Laura Hewitt-Walker, supra note 111.
126. Hewitt-Walker, supra note 123. I n  addition to the OPUS project at 1521 2nd Avenue
(121,834 square feet), a project at 1635 8th Avenue has made a payment of $570,246 (representing
37,635 square feet of bonus area), and a project at 2000 3rd Avenue has signed an agreement seek-
ing 148,939 square feet of bonus space of which 16,384 square feet will be reserved on site as af-
fordable. Id. ;  see also Laura Hewitt-Walker, Seattle Office of  Hous., DPD Land Use Bulletins
(2007) (unpublished spreadsheet of DPD land use information bulletins) (on file with author) (the
Ava Tower Project has requested 113,285 bonus square feet, and a project at 1903 5th Avenue has
stated that it could seek up to twenty floors of bonus area, and ten other projects have yet to deter-
mine whether bonus area will be sought).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.4 (2007), available at hup://www.muni
code.com/Resourcesigateway.asp?pid=141398zsid=5 (select sec. 315.4).
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Francisco expanded on a limited inclusionary housing plan in 2002, en-
acting a comprehensive mandatory plan administered under the auspices
of the Mayor's Office of Housing.
129 T h r o u g h  
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t
to address concerns about both the displacement of low-income house-
holds and the exploding housing market.
13c1 S a n  
F r a n c i s c o  
r e q u i r e s  
d e -
velopers to record a Notice of Special Restrictions, which outlines af-
fordability restrictions for all affordable housing units ,
I31 r e f e r r e d  t o  a sBelow Market Rate units (BMRUs).
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m a k e s  
a l l  
B M R U s
affordable for the life of the building.
133 The length of unit affordability is a particularly contentious issue in
San Francisco.
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argue that long-term price controls on inclusionary units reduce the prop-
erty valu s f market-rate units .
135 A s  a  
r e s u l t ,  
e v e l o p e r
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w i l l  
s e e k  
t o
maximize their bottom lines by creating high-end luxury units to com-
pensate for the decrease in unit values and pass the costs onto market-
rate purchasers.
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increase in the length of affordability ensures that communities remain
viable for low- and moderate-income residents.
137 S a n  F r a n c i s c o  
h a s
adopted the position that sustained affordability of inclusionary units will
129. See Mayor's Office of Haus., City & County of S.F., Below Market Rate Inclusionary
Housing Program, http://www.sfgov.orgisite/moh_page.asp?id
-
-48003 ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v .  
1 0 ,  2 0 0 8 ) .
130. S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.2, available at http://www.municode.com/Res-
ources/gateway.asp?pid-14139&sid-5 (select sec. 315.2). I n May of 2005, the California Associa-
tion of Realtors reported the median home price in San Francisco was $755,000, 365% higher than
the national average; moreover, the mean rent for a 2-bedroom apartment was $1821 per month,
which is affordable to households earning over $74,000. Nicholas Brunick, Inclusionary Housing:
Proven Success in Large Cities, 10 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 5 (2004), available at http://www.oakland-
net.com/BlueRibbonCommission/PDFs/BlueRibbon8-proven%20success.pdf.
131 S.F ., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.7(b), available at http://www.municode.com
/Resourcesigateway.asp?pid-14139 &sid-5 (select sec. 315.7).
132.M. § 315.2.
133. Id *  315.7(a). San Francisco's developmental maturity is an underlying reason why
inclusionary units created must be recorded as permanently affordable. Id. § 315.7. San Francisco is
a mature city, whose geographical location at the northern end of a peninsula prevents substantial
new development and limits development to areas such as infill sites and sites not previously desig-
nated as residential. See id. * 315.2(4).
134.  BENJAMIN POWELL &  EDWARD STRINGHAM, HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY: D o
AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDAT ES W O RK? POLICY STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Reason F ound.
2004), available at http://www.reason.org/ps3 I 8.pdf.
135. id. at 16.
136. M
137. Nico Calavita & Kenneth Grimes, Inclusionary Housing in California: The Experience of
Two Decades, 64 J. AM. PLAN. ASSN. 150, 164 (1998), available at http://www.oaklandnetcomi
BlueRibbonCotmnissioWPDR/BlueRibbon9-CA%20experience.pdf.
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prevent the long-term loss of affordable hous ing;
138 t h e r e f o r e ,  
B M R U s
remain permanently affordable.
139 San Francisco maintains specific income level thresholds for very-
low-, low-, and moderate-income residents. I
"  R e s i d e n t s  
e a r n i n g  
a s
much as 150% of the median income for the city are allowed to apply to
buy  BMR1.1.
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with an i come not exceeding 60% of the median income for the city.142
Yet, because of the limited number of available BMRUs, only the needi-
est households generally receive them, leaving a void for low- and mod-
erate-income households.
143 In exchange for constructing BMRUs, San Francisco offers devel-
opers several economic benefits, including refunding planning and de-
velopment fees .
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of building standards, which enables developers to build more units than
is generally allowed by the planning code, resulting in projects with in-
creased density.'
45 The trade-off for these density bonuses, however, is the steep price
that San Francisco exacts from developers by mandating that all devel-
138. Id at 164-65.
139. S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.7(b) (2007).
140. Mayor's Office of Hous., City & County of S.F., 2007 Sample Sales Prices for the San
Francisco Inclusionary Housing Program, http://www.sfgov.orgisite/uploadedfiles/moh/Rent_Levels
/M0H2007AMlinclusionaryPurchaseCalcs_CCSFonly(1).pdf. See also Mayor's Office of Hous.,
City &  County o f  S.F., 2007 Maximum Monthly Rent by Unit Type, http://www.sfgov.orgi
site/uploadedffiesimoh/Rent LevelsiMOH2007AMI_RentLimitsCCS-Fonly.pdf. When considering
income level thresholds, the city employs the universal HUD benchmark that limits allowable rent to
30% of income. I d
141. Mayor's Office of Hous., City & County of S.F., Maximum Qualifying Income Limits for
the Purchase o f  a BMRU, http://www.sfgov.orgisite/uploadedfilesimolilRent_Levels/M0H2008
AMI_IncomeLimits-CCSFonly.pdf. For  a one-person household, 150% of the median is $87,100.
Id
142. Mayor's Office of  Hous., City & County of S.F., Below Market Rate ("BMR") Rental
Program Overview, http://www.sfgov.orgisite/moh_page.asp?id=59318 (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
143. Id.; see also Mayor's Office of  Hons., City & County of S.F., BMR Units Available,
http://www.sfgov.orgisitelmoh_page.asp?id=35416 (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). Generally, house-
holds earning less than $33,700 per year are the best candidates for receiving BMRUs. See id. An
income of $33,700 is equal to 60% of median. I d  As  of Sept. 11, 2007, the city did not have any
available rental units in any new or existing developments. Id.
144. S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.4 (2007). San Francisco rejected a totally voluntary
inclusionary housing plan on the basis of a 2004 California study that indicated that voluntary plans
compromise the city's ability to guarantee the creation of local affordable housing. I d  § 315.2; see
generally Nat' l  Hous. Conference, Inclusionary Zoning: The California Experience, 3 NCH
AFFORDABLE HOBS. POL'Y REV., Feb. 2004, available at http://www.oaklandnet.com/BlueRibbon
Coimnission/PDR/BlueRibbon25-NHC JZ_Rpt.pdf.
145. S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.2(8) (2007). Building standards are relaxed through
the conditional use and planned unit development process. I d
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opments involving more than five units contain BMRUs.
146 A  d e v e l o p e rcan choose from four basic plans: (1) on-site construction of BMRUs; (2)
off-site construction of BMRUs; (3) compliance through a fee-in-lieu of
development; or (4) a combination of on-site construction, off-site con-
struction, and payment of a fee-in-lieu.
147 A developer of a residential project creating BMRUs on-site—the
first plan—must reserve 12% of the units as BMRUs if  the project con-
tains more than five units and is taller than 120 feet.
148 A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
a
developer selecti g the off-site development option—the second plan—
must create the equivalent of 17% of the total units produced in the prin-
cipal project off-s ite.
149 U n d e r  
t h e  
t h i r d  
p l a n
,  
r a t h
e r  
t h
a n  
d e v e
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n g
units, a develop r may pay a fee-in-lieu of performance:
5c
' I n  c a l c u l a t i n g
this fee, the San Francisco plan considers two factors. 151 Firs t, the
Mayor's Office of Housing will consider the number of units that would
have been created off-s ite.
152 S e c o n d ,  
t h e  
c i t y  
w i l l  
w e i g
h  
t h
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a f f o
r d a -
bility gap—yearly data on the cost of residential housing construction.
153
146. Id § 315.3(a), available at http://www.municode.com/Resourcesigateway.asp?pid=1413
9&sid=5 (select sec. 315.3).
147. Id § 315.5(g), available at http://www.municode.comfResources/gateway.asp?pid-14139
&sid=5 (s lect sec. 315.5). There is a fifth option, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of
this Comment. A  developer may use California tax-exempt bonds to fund its obligation of construc-
tion as long as a certain percentage of the units are affordable at specific median income levels. Id.
148. Id § 315.4(a)(1)(B). For  buildings that are less than 120 feet tall, there is a 15% reserva-
tion rate. See id *  315.4(0(1). The BMRUs must be completed and ready for occupancy no later
than the market-rate units. See id. § 315.4 (b). Following the completion of the units, the Mayor's
Office of Housing assumes the obligation of marketing the units for either rent or purchase. See id. §
315.4(d).
149. Id. § 315.5(a)(1)(C). This part of the provision for off-site housing applies to buildings
over 120 feet in height. I d  A  developer must create the equivalent of 20% of the total number of
units produced in the principal project off-site, rounded up to the nearest whole unit for projects that
are less than 120 feet. I d  § 315.5(a)(1)(B). Moreover, the construction of off-site units must be
completed simultaneously with those contained within the principal project and located within one
mile of the principal project. I d  § 315.5(b)—(c).
150. Id *  315.6(a), available at http://www.municode.com/Resourcesigateway.asp?pid=14139
&sid=5 (select sec. 315.6).
151. Id § 315.6(b). For  example, i f a developer undertook a project with a height above 120
feet and yielding 250 market-rate units, 42.5 units would be created off-site. See S.F., CAL., PLAN.
CODE art. 3, * 315.6(13)(1) (unlike the off-site option, the number of units is not rounded up to the
nearest unit, but remains a fraction). According to the current affordability gap data, the current
price per unit is $179,952 per studio apartment and $248,210 for a one-bedroom unit. Mayor ' s
Office of Hons., City & County of S.F., Notice of New Inclusionary Housing Fees Effective July 15,
2008 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.sfgov.orgisite/uploadedfilesimohinotices/Inclusionary
%20Fee%20Notice%202008%20FINAL%2OREVISED%208.28.08.pdf. Thus, i f a developer builds
twenty studio apartments and 22.5 one-bedroom apartments, a total payment of $9,143,765 will be
due from the developer. See S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.6.
152. Id. Depending on the size of the project, there would have been either a 17% or 20% off-
site requirement.
153. Id. § 315.6(2)(3). But see Mayor's Office of Hons., City & County of S.F., Notice of New
Inclusionary Housing Fees Effective July 15, 2008 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.sfgov.
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Alternatively, under the fourth plan, a developer may fulfi ll the BMRU
requirement by any combination of on-site units, off-site units, and fee-
in-lieu of development if  the total BMRU construction and fees are satis-
fied for the project'
s .
'
Although the potential funds that could be raised via San Fran-
cisco's mandatory plan could far exceed the funds raised under Seattle's
voluntary plan, the number of BMRUs actually created through the San
Francisco plan has been relatively modest. Iss Only  736 BMRUs were
created between the years of 2002 and 2006.
156 T h i s  l a c k  
o f  B M R U s  
i s
consistent with previous findings,
l57 b u t  s o m e  
c o m m e n t a t o
r s  
a r g u e  
t h a t
the lack of BMRUs is a clear signal that San Francisco's inclusionary
housing plan has failed.
158 Nevertheless, in the absence of a reason to believe that the manda-
tory inclusionary plan will be changed or repealed, affordable housing
advocates and inclusionary housing proponents have, at least momentar-
ily, won the support of the Mayor's Office of Housing over the continued
org/siteluploadedfiles/mohinoticesanclusionary%20Fee%20Notice%202008%20FINAL%2OREVIS
ED%208.28.08.pdf. The in-lieu fee will be calculated according to the annual percentage change in
the construction cost index (CC1) for San Francisco, instead of the current affordability gap data. Id.
154. Id. § 315.4(e)(3).
155.  CAL.  COAL.  FOR RURAL HODS. &  N O N
-
P R O F I T  H o p s .  
A s s o c .  
O F  
N O R T H E R N  
C A L . ,  
s u p r a
note 61, at 34.
156. S.F. Planning Dep't, San Francisco Housing Inventory 22 (2007), available at http://
www.sfgov.orgisite/uploadedfiles/planning/Citywide/pdf/Housing_Inventory_2006.pdf. From 1973
through April 2004, only 7,000 BMRUs were created in 50 Bay Area cities combined. POWELL &
STRINGHAM, supra note 134, at 318.
157. S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.2.
158. POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 134. Powel l  argues that the costs of inclusionary
units are passed on, not only to developers, but also to market-rate home buyers who incur an addi-
tional $22,000 to $100,000 in costs. Powell also argues that inclusionary housing drives away de-
velopers, resulting in less unit development and less home buying. Id. Lastly, he asserts that restric-
tions on the resale of inclusionary housing units cost cities tax revenue. Id. Instead, Powell posits
that inclusionary land use regulations (and other land use regulations) have skewed the supply and
demand curve, preventing developers from producing an adequate amount of units, and driving up
the price for units that are produced. Id. The proposed solution is a loosening of land use regula-
tions so that developers can build an amount of units commensurate with the market demand. But
see VICTORIA BASOLO N I C O  CALAVI T A,  POLICY CLAI MS WITH W EAK EVIDENCE: A  CRITIQUE OF
THE REASO N FOUNDATION ST UDY ON INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PO LI CY I N SAN FRANCISCO B A Y
AREA 4- 12 (2004) , avai lable a t  http://www.oaklandnet.com/BlueRibbonCommissioWPDFs/
Attachment%203%20-%20Critique%20of%20Reason%20Study.pdf. T he critique argues that the
Reason Foundation Study contains design flaws because the study fails to consider rental units and
provides an incomplete analysis of the cities' inclusionary plans. Id. The inability of the inclusion-
ary plan to create enough affordable units on its own is mitigated by the broader comprehensive
housing affordability plan, which has also included independent city expenditures in excess of $232
million between 2006 and 2008. S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.2(14).
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objections of developers and some economists:
59 T h e  c i t y ' s  
a b i l i t y  t o
demand particularly strong monetary concessions from developers has
much to do with the higher prices developers may command from pur-
chasers in the accelerated San Francisco housing market:
6° P r o p e r t yvalues and demand for market-rate housing give developers many oppor-
tunities to generate profits, even after the inclusionary housing units or
fees are incorporated into the bottom line:
61 T h e r e f o r e ,  
a l t h o u g h  
S a n
Francisco's rat  of inclusionary unit production may be commendable,
its inclusionary housing plan does not provide an ideal model for cities
whose property values and housing demand levels are closer to the na-
tional norm.
C. Denver
Like other cities across the country, Denver enacted an inclusionary
housing plan in response to the rapid growth and continued strength of
the city's housing market:
62 T h e  
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bonuses in xchange for mandatory development of Moderately Priced
Dwelling Units (MPDU5).
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curred when developers contributed to the lack of affordable housing by
creating new housing units that were skewed towards households earning
more than 100% of the median income for the area:
64 The Denver plan requires the retention of 10% of the total units in a
project as MPDUs if  the project contains thirty or more units for sale:
65When the project is complete, the developer must record a covenant for
each MPD U
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including a stated restriction on the resale o f  the MPDU for fifteen
159 MAYOR'S OFFICE OF CMTY. DEV. ET AL., CITY &  COUNTY OF S.F., FIVE-YEAR
CONSOLIDATED PLAN 79 (2006), available at http://www.sfgov.orgisite/uploadedfilesimoh/Reports/
2005-2010Consolid-atedPlanv16.pdf.
160. id.
161. Zillow.com, San Francisco Home Value Information, http://www.zillow.comirealestate/
CA-San-Francisco-affordability (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). According to Zillow.com, as of No-
vember 10, 2008, the current median price of condominiums in San Francisco is 8818,500, or 384%
above the national median price of $213,242. I d  These figures, however, fluctuate daily due to
market conditions.
162 DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE ch. 27, §  101(a)—(h) (2002), available at
http://www.muni-code.comiresoumesigateway.asp?pid=102578csid=6 (select 27-101). The strength
in the housing market has inflated construction costs and property values, thereby raising housing
costs.
163.M. * 101.
164. Id
165. Id § 105(a), available at http://www.municode.comiresourcesigateway.asp?pid-102578c
sid-6 (select 27-105).
166. Id § 111(a), available at http://www.municode.comiresourcesigateway.asp?pid=10257
Lisid=6 (select 27-111).
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years.167 A  right of first refusal is also integrated into the MPDU cove-
nant.
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market for the first time within ten years of the original purchase date,
I69giving Denver the opportunity to keep MPDUs affordable beyond the
fifteen-year control period.'"
Under the plan, the maximum sales price a developer can charge for
a unit depends on both the height of the building and the adjusted median
income.
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and is greater than three stories tall must preserve 10% of the units for
households earning less than 95% of  adjusted median income.
172 B e -cause the current adjusted median income for a one-person household in
the city is $50,300,
1
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$47,785 or less .
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$133,948.
175 As an alternative to developing MPDUs on-site, a developer may
either develop the units at another site within a half-mile of a light rail
s tation
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"
Denver uses a table to calculate the current for-sale unit prices for each
adjusted median income level, which depends on a unit's total bed-
rooms.178 After determining the relevant sale price, the city seeks only
50% of the net price per MPDU from the developer.
179
167. I d  §§ 111(d), I03(h), available at http://www.municode.comiresourcesigateway.asp?
pid=102578zsid=6 (select 27-103).
168. I d  § 112(a), available at http://www.municode.comiresourcesigateway.asp?pid=10257
8csid=6 (select 27-112).
169. Id § 112(a).
170. Id § I03(h).
171. M  § I05(a)—(e).
172. Id § I05(a). A  project containing more than thirty units, but less than three stories tall, is
required to keep 10% of  the units as affordable for households earning no more than 80% of the
adjusted median income. Id.
173. Denver Off. of Econ. Dev., Income Limits (2008), available at http://www.milehigh.com
//resourcesicustom/pdf/housing/2008 JHO_Income_Limits.pdf [hereinafter Income Limits].
I X  Id.
175. Denver  Off. of  Econ. Dev., Maximum Prices, Cash In-Lieu Fees, and Income Limits
(2006), available at  http://www.milehigh.cotniiresourcesicustom/pdffhousingil stHalf-2006Price_
List.pdf. As  such, using the 80% median income standard a developer can sell a studio MPDU for a
maximum of $106,820. I t  should be noted that although Denver has increased the median-income
thresholds for  2008, the sale price for an inclusionary unit has stayed constant at the price set in
2006. See Income Limits, supra note 173.
176. DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNI. CODE ch. 27, § 106(b)(1)(B), available at http://www.muni-
code.corniresourcesigateway.asp?pid=102578zsid=6 (select 27-106).
177. Id * 106(b)(I)(C).
178. Id
179. Id Al though the prices vary depending on the size of the MPDUs (from $40,773 for a
studio unit at 80% of  the adjusted median income to $99,815 for a four bedroom unit at 95% of
2009] R e s p o n s i b l e  Development? 4 6 5
Denver also aggressively tries to reduce the cost of its inclusionary
housing plan by providing developers with several incentives:
8° F i r s t ,the city eimburses developers $5,500 per MPDU built, regardless of the
size of the unit.
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the adjusted median income, the c ity  increases the reimbursement
mount from $5,500 to $10,000 per MPDU unit, up to a maximum of
50% of the total units in the development.
182 T h e  
r e i m b u r s e m e n t  
d o e s
not apply to those developments that take advantage of the fee-in-lieu
option, and all reimburse ent amounts depend on the availability of city
funds.
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in many development zones a square footage bonus of up to 10% of the
total project.'" The additional bonus area is not exempt from the 10%
MPDU requirement; therefore, the units created in the bonus space are
calculated towards the total MPDUs for the project.
185 T h i r d ,  a  
d e v e l -
oper can also apply for reduced parking requirements of up to 20% of the
total spaces generally required by the applicable zoning.186 The devel-
oper must provide more MPDUs at the rate of one MPDU per ten spaces
reduced.
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dited development review, including site plan review within 180 days of
the of cceptance date of the application.
188 Although the Denver plan is mandatory, it  is less comprehensive
than plans in other cities: the Denver plan applies only to residential for-
sale units, and these units must remain affordable only for a brief period.
More specifically, the Denver plan regulates only residential for-sale
units, whereas most other cities regulate both for-sale and rental units :
89Rental unit developers in Denver may voluntarily choose to create af-
adjusted median income), the developer can anticipate paying on average $75,000 per unit into the
affordable housing pool. See Income Limits, supra note 173.
180. DENVER, COLO., REV. MON. CODE ch. 27, § 107(a), available at http://www.municode.
comiresourcesigateway.asp?pid=102578csid=6 (select 27-107).
181./d
182. Id Practically, for a developer to qualify for the larger reimbursement, it would have to
price the units as affordable for households earning between $30,100 for a studio unit and $49,900
for a six bedroom unit. I d  Moreover, the incentive is capped at a total of $250,000, per develop-
ment, per year. I d
183. Id § I07(a). The reimbursement is paid out of the same special revenue fund that re-
ceives the fees in lieu from developers; thus, the amount of funds available for reimbursement de-
pends on the number of developers that participate in the fee-in-lieu. I d
184. I d  § 108(b), available at http://www.municode.comiresourcesigateway.asp?pid=10257
8zsid-6 (select 27-108).
185. Id § 108(b)(2).
186. Id § 108(c).
187. M
188. Id § 108(d).
189. Id § 114, available at http://www.municode.comiresourcesigateway.asp?pid-102578Esid
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fordable units in exchange for a reimbursement of $5,500 per MPDU,
I
"
but they are not required to participate.
191 Unlike other inclusionary housing plans, however, the Denver plan
applies to both new for-sale residential units and existing buildings re-
modeled or converted to contain for-sale units .
192 T h u s ,  t h e  
D e n v e r  
p l a n
could at least theoretically reach more buildings in total, depending on
the number of major renovation and conversion projects throughout the
city.
The Denver plan is also inhibited by a shortened affordability pe-
riod of fifteen years, which is considerably less than the period in other
plans across the country.
I93 T h e  
b r e v i t y  
o f  
t h e  
c o n t r
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c a s
t s  
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u b
t
on the long-term affordability of MPDUs as the units are resold after the
control period ends. This brief control period may well have encouraged
developers to build under the assumption that purchasers of market-rate
units could be convinced that property values would spike when the
MPDUs are converted to normal market-rate units. More important, a
fifteen-year control period, combined with a marked reduction in new
development, will defeat the main goal of the plan because it will likely
lead to fewer long-term MPDUs in Denver.
Nevertheless, Denver has achieved a great deal of overall success in
a limited amount of time.'" Some urban planners argue that the Denver
plan is the most successful inclusionary housing plan in existence today,
with a total of 3,392 MPDUs already created or in the pipeline since the
enactment.
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site as opposed to taking advantage of the fee-in-lieu option.
196 A l t h o u g hthe plan's future s ccess remains uncertain,
197 t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
m a n y  
d e v e l -
opers have built on-site units makes the Denver plan a current success,
for having achieved several goals of  responsible development such as
integration, density, and affordability.
198
190. Id The rental units must be affordable to households not earning more than 65% of the
adjust d median income. I d  The MPDU's must remain affordable for 15 year. I d
191. Id.
192. See i d  § 102(e), available at http://www.municode.comiresourcesigateway.asp?pid=
102578csid=6 (select 27-102).
193. Id *  103(h). Seattle requires units to remain affordable for 50 years. SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUN. CODE tit. 23, § 49.015B(2) (2006). I n  comparison, San Francisco requires units to remain
affordable permanently. S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, 315.7 (2007).
194. Brimick, supra note 130, at 4.
195.M
196. Id I n  fact, the city reports zero fee-in-lieu contributions since the enactment of the plan
in 2002. Id
197. Id at 3-4. Some experts attribute the success of Denver's plan to the broader develop-
ment bubble that has spurred development throughout the country over the past several years. I d
198. DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE ch. 27, 103( h)  (2002).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SEATTLE'S INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PLAN
The City of Seattle should incorporate elements from the inclusion-
ary housing plans of San Francisco and Denver to better balance devel-
oper incentives with the creation of affordable housing.
I99 S e a t t l e ' s  m u -nicipal l adership has made a strong commitment to the success of its
inclusionary housing plan, as shown by the publicity surrounding the
enactment of the Downtown Livability Legis lation.
m T h e  c i t y  s h o u l dexpand on this legislation. First, the plan should be mandatory. Second,
the plan should apply to all residential projects that exceed a minimum
size. Third, the plan should give more incentives for on-site construc-
tion, while deemphasizing the fee-in-lieu option. Finally, both the con-
trol period and the efficiency factor should become variable in those pro-
jects where the affordable units are constructed on-site.
A. Adopt a Mandatory Plan
Under Seattle's current plan, even during periods o f  significant
growth, developers can opt out by building to the base height in down-
town zones without contributing anything to affordable hous ine
ol U n -der these circumstances, voluntary inclusionary housing plans become
less effective than mandatory p lane
2 I n  f a c t ,  
t h e  
fi f t e e n  
m o s t  
p r o d u c
-
tive inclusion ry plans in California are mandatory.
m M a n d a t o r y  p l a n sare more successful at creating affordable housing because they (1) pro-
duce more low- and very-low-income units; (2) offer developers more
predictability through uniform expectations and requirements; and (3)
afford more predictability for c ities.
204 First, mandatory plans produce more low- and very-low-income
housing than voluntary plans because in their absence, cities must give
large subsidies to encourage the production of affordable units .
205 U n d e ra voluntary plan, even if  a developer offers some affordable units, it will
offer moderate-income units because moderate-income units enhance the
developer's bottom line and offset the long-term impact that low-income
units may have on property values. Certainly, moderate-income units are
199. Press Release, City of Seattle Mayor's Office, supra note 88.
200. Id.
201. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, * 49.015 (2006).
202. Nicholas J. Brunicic, The Inclusionary Housing Debate: The Effectiveness of  Mandatory
Programs Over Voluntary Programs, 9 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 2, 6 (2004), available at http://www.
oaklandnet.com/BlueRibbonConunission/PDFs/BlueRibbon7-effectiveness.pdf.
203. Id at 4; see also Calavita, supra note 137, at 164
-
65.
204. Brunielt, supra note 202, at 4.
205. Id
468 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:443
an essential aspect of Seattle's housing stock.
206 N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
l o w -  
a n d
very-low-income units are equally essential components to creating a
well-balanced housing stock. Developers, however, are more likely to
avoid building these units because of their higher short-term and long-
term costs.
Second, mandatory plans are more predictable because a developer
knows from the outset the given requirements and incentives.
m T h i spredictability allows developers to make economically efficient choices
early in the development process based on their superior information.
m Third, rather than leaving a city to guess which developers with a
project in the pipeline might participate in a voluntary inclusionary plan,
a mandatory plan permits a city to plan more effectively for the future.
2139Conversely, under a voluntary plan, city planning is a reactionary process
whereby the planning allocation can begin only after a developer indi-
cates that it will participate in the inclusionary plan.
21° In Seattle, the current inclusionary plan's voluntary option impairs
the ability to predict how much affordable housing might be created. I n
times of slower growth, developers will scale back their projects under
the voluntary plan and produce little affordable housing. The lack of
developer participation in Seattle's voluntary plan since its enactment in
2006 highlights the unpredictability of voluntary plans.
211 I n  o t h e r  c i t i e s ,including San Francisco and Denver, th  lack of  developer interest in
voluntary participation has created a trend toward mandatory plans. The
City of Seattle should switch to a mandatory plan now, rather than wait-
ing to see whether its incentives and bonuses are attractive enough to
entice developers to create the affordable housing that Seattle's residents
desperately need.
212 Despite the benefits that a mandatory plan will bring to Seattle,
some housing advocates and local politicians question whether Seattle
could transition to a mandatory plan without attracting lawsuits from de-
velopers who could claim that a mandatory plan results in unauthorized
takings.
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206. See Press Release, City of Seattle Mayor's Office, supra note 88. The addition of moder-
ate-income units is essential as Seattle adds more jobs to the downtown-core. The addition of mod-
erate-income units prevents new workers from seeking housing outside the city-core. See id.
207. Brunick, supra note 202, at 4.
208. Id
209. Id. at 5.
210. See id. at 4.
211. Hewitt-Walker, supra note 123. There are only three projects in which developers have
agreed to pay into the affordable housing pool in lieu of developing these units themselves. Id.
212. See discussion supra Part 111.A.
213. See Draft Incentive Zoning Resolution, Seattle Housing Development Consortium (Dec.
31, 2007) (on tile with author). The draft ordinance drafted by Council Member Sally Clark in con-
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Court has yet to address whether mandatory affordable housing produc-
tion in return for the approval of developer projects is an unconstitutional
taking.214 To date, the Court has stated only that a mandatory housing
plan is not unconstitutional i f  there is a nexus between a condition on
permit approval and the original purpose of the building restriction and
the condition is roughly proportional to the impact of the development.
215 Seattle, however, should not allow the possibility of litigation to re-
strain its attempt to institute a mandatory plan. Under  Washington's
Growth Management Act (GMA), a city may enact or expand an afford-
able housing incentive program, even if  the program imposes a tax, fee,
or charge on the development of the property .
216 T h u s ,  t h e  
G M A  
i m p l i c -
itly authorizes cities to impose charges on developers if  the charges are
balanced by incentives. Although current law does not foreclosure the
possibility of litigation in the event that a mandatory plan is instituted,
the GMA should, to some extent, protect a mandatory plan against attack.
B. Apply the Inclusionary Plan to Projects
that Meet a Minimum Unit Threshold
Seattle should institute a mandatory inclusionary plan that affects
only projects greater than a certain unit threshold. Under the current leg-
islation, Seattle allows any project up to the baseline height the leeway to
develop as many units as feasible under the particular project plan?" In
contrast, the inclusionary plans in San Francisco and Denver apply only
when a project exceeds a minimum number of units, generally between
five and thirty units!"
junction with the Seattle Housing Development Consortium expands inclusionary housing to other
zones throughout Seattle, but like the downtown inclusionary housing legislation, it fails to require
mandatory developer participation. I d  As  a result, the new zones will have similar difficulties in
attracting developer participation. See also E-mail from Anonymous, Housing Development Con-
sortium, to Author (Oct. 16, 2008, 11:48 PST) (on file with author). Housing advocates feel that city
officials will not support a mandatory plan until another city successfully litigates the validity of a
mandatory plan, or the Washington legislature grants explicit authorization for a mandatory plan via
an amendment to the Growth Management Act.
214. See Michelle DaRosa, Comment, When Are Affordable Housing Exactions an Unconstitu-
tional Taking?, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 453, 464-69 (2007).
215. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comnf n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388 (1994).
216. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540 (2006); see also H.B. 3213, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2008) (stating that a city or town may collect a reasonable fee from affordable housing incentive
applicants to cover administrative costs associated with the program).
217. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, § 49.015 (2006). The calculation is based off of
square footage, not units.
218. In San Francisco, a development as small as one involving five units must include inclu-
sionary units. See S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.3(a) (2007). Conversely, in Denver, a pro-
ject must involve 30 units or more before it is required to include inclusionary units. See DENVER,
COLO., REV. MTN. CODE ch. 27, § 105(a) (2002).
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Arriving at the minimum number of units that would trigger the in-
clusionary provision poses challenges. O n  one hand, i f  the minimum
unit threshold is set too low, the city runs the risk of harming small
builders who do not have the unit margin to recover the costs of the in-
clusionary units. O n the other hand, if  the threshold is set too high, the
city might see an increased amount of development proposals configured
to avoid the inclusionary requirements. For  example, in Denver where
the minimum is thirty units, some developers have purposely built twen-
ty-nine units to escape the requirements of the inclusionary plan.
219 B e -cause Seattle calculates payments by developers based on square footage
rather than per unit, the city would have to either remove the square foot-
age calculations or come up with a benchmark unit size to convert the
square footage into an estimated number of units. To avoid some of the
problems Denver has experienced in preventing developers from build-
ing below the unit minimum, the Seattle Office of Housing should estab-
lish a unit minimum that fluctuates from zone to zone throughout the
city. The unit minimum for each zone could be adjusted on a quarterly
basis to give continued predictability for developers while also correcting
for changing market conditions.
C. Increase Developer Incentives for
On-Site Construction of Affordable Units
To offset the greater costs associated with mandatory inclusionary
plans, Seattle should increase incentives and bonuses for on-site con-
struction of affordable units, while reducing the availability of the option
to pay a fee-in-lieu of development.
220 F i r s t ,  
b o r r o w i n g  
f r o m  
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plan, Seattle should reimburse developers at a flat rate per affordable
unit.
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on square footage, the city could reimburse the developer at the close of
the project, based on the total realized number of units .
222 E x p a n d i n g  o n
219. E-mail from Brian Phetteplace, Housing Program Manager, Downtown Denver Partner-
ship, to author (Nov. 29, 2007, 11 :45 PSI)  (on file with author) (explaining that Denver has seen
developers construct projects with exactly 29 units, one short of the inclusionary housing plan mini-
mum, to avoid compliance with the statute).
220. For a developer to gain permission to build the market-rate units, a mandatory plan re-
quires that the developer build a set number of units in each development below the market rate.
Therefore, the developer will necessarily sell the below market-rate units at a loss. As  a result, the
developer may suffer a variable loss on the entire project that depends on the number of below-
market rate units a city's inclusionary housing plan requires, less any methods a developer institutes
to mitigate that loss—such as incrementally raising the for-sale prices of the market-rate units. See
POWELL, supra note 134, at 9.
221. See DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE ch. 27, § 107 (2002). Seattle could adopt payment
options similar to those in Denver ($5,500410,000 per unit). See id.
222. See SEATILE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, § 49.015(B)(I)(b) (2006).
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the Denver plan, Seattle could make reimbursements out of the fee-in-
lieu revenue pool if  units are constructed on-site to defray the costs at-
tributable to developing these on-site units .
223 Second, expanding on the San Francisco plan, Seattle should offer
developers a marginal reduction in the number of  inclusionary units
needed to be built if  those units are built on-site.
224 T h e  m a r g i n a l  
r e d u c -
tion in units would m ke off-site development or payment of the in-lieu
fee comparatively more expensive than building on-site.
225 A  f e e - i n - l i e uof development is now the easi st option for the developer because none
of its time is spent actually building inclusionary units. I f  the cost of this
transaction increases enough, however, the fee-in-lieu option becomes
less attractive, and producing units on-site becomes a more viable option.
To raise the costs of the off-site development and fee-in-lieu op-
tions, Seattle should reduce the efficiency factor from 80% to a lower
percentage in exchange for on-site construction.
226 T h e  e f fi c i e n c y  
f a c t o r
would then operate as a variable indicator of the more general economic
health of the housing market for those developers constructing units on-
site. T he  efficiency factor would increase during times of  economic
prosperity when developers are likely to command higher per unit prices,
and conversely, it would decrease when the housing market cools off, so
as not to disincentivize continued development. Instituting a variable
efficiency factor necessarily requires the city to engage in a fiction: al-
though gross square footage is constant regardless of the efficiency fac-
tor, a developer gains more usable square footage to shift into market-
rate units at no additional charge. Manipulating the efficiency factor,
however, is worth the cost of the resulting marginal reduction in units
because on-site development better achieves the goals of responsible de-
velopment: Seattle's balancing o f  density and affordability across a
broad-spectrum of socio-economic levels coupled with continued devel-
oper profitability.
227
223. DENvER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE ch. 27, 107.
224. Compare S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, *  315.4(b) (2007), with id. § 315.5(a)(1)(c), and
id. § 3115.6(b)(1).
225. See, e.g., id. §§ 315.4,315.5, 315.6.
226. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 23, § 49.015(B). Under Seattle's current plan the
gross bonus square footage sought is multiplied by an efficiency factor of 80% to achieve the net
bonus square footage chargeable to the developer. Id. § 49.015. Although the statute does not de-
fine the efficiency factor, implicit in the calculation is the notion that a portion of the square footage
of each floor plate is lost or  unusable as living space as a result of the construction process, and
therefore should not be chargeable to the developer. See id.; see also discussion supra Part III.A.2.
227. See discussion supra note 15. Responsible development is satisfied when a city success-
fully balances density and affordability across a broad spectrum of socio-economic levels with con-
tinued developer profitability.
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Although the fee-in-lieu option gives a developer flexibility and
protects the value of  market-rate units by moving affordable units to
some other area within the city, it is contrary to sound principles of re-
sponsible development. The collected fees are apportioned to different
projects around the entire city and may be used for single-family or small
multi-family affordable developments, both far from the original project
and in outlying neighborhoods away from the major business and service
centers. A s  a result, in many instances low-income citizens must still
commute back into the city core for work. This decreases density, per-
petuates greater urban sprawl, and adds to traffic congestion.
In addition, because the payment in lieu of development fund does
not have enough cash to fund new projects on its own, the city is unlikely
to do anything more than supplement the cost of affordable housing pro-
jects that are partly funded and built through other city programs.
228With only three current projects enlisted in the bonus program, unless
developer participation in the program increases exponentially, it will be
years before the city gathers sufficient funding to construct an entire pro-
ject.
The fee-in-lieu option will also lead to gentrification in some of the
key development areas throughout Seattle's core.
229 F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
h i s -
torically, areas surrounding the Denny Triangle, one of the centers of
recent development in Seattle, comprised warehouses and small store-
fronts?" The combination of developers choosing to build expensive
housing units, coupled with the city's promotion of the fee-in-lieu, has
initiated the gentrification of the Denny Triangle.
231 S e a t t l e  s h o u l d  
h a v e
a goal to create th  affordable density where it  is needed most. San
Francisco explicitly recognized that new market-rate housing develop-
ments increase the need for affordable developments in the same local-
ized area, so that service industry professionals can efficiently serve the
new market-rate residents.
232 N e w  
m a r k e t -
r a t e  
d e v e l o p
m e n t  
i n  
S e a t
t l e
will increase the demand for service industry citizens in and around the
228. Proceeds from the Commercial Bonus Program have been used to supplement the con-
struction of affordable housing units. WSHFC NEWSLETTER, supra note 124, at 11.
229. Gentrification occurs when affluent citizens move into traditionally lower-income areas,
raising property values and rents, and thereby causing a proportional decline in racial and socio-
economic minorities as those citizens are priced Out of the area. See Dara K. Newman, Comment, I f
You Can't Build It, They Won't Come: Condominium Moratoria and Gentrification, 35 B.C. ENVTL.
AFT. L. REV. 593, 596 (2008).
230. Louis Fiset, Seattle Neighborhoods: Cascade and South Lake Union — Thumbnail History,
HISTORYLINK.ORG, Apr. 9, 2001, http://www.historylinkorgiessaystoutput.cfm?file_id=3178.
231. Hewitt-Walker, supra note 123. The Denny Triangle is a triangle of blocks that runs from
Northwest to Northeast along Denny Way to Court Place, South from Court Place along Interstate 5
to Convention Place, and Northwest along 6th Avenue.
232. S.F., CAL., PLAN. CODE art. 3, § 315.2 (2007).
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new development. Yet ,  because of  the lack of  affordable housing in
those areas, those citizens will have to commute from outside the key
residential development areas, worsening congestion. T he  affordable
units should instead be built where they are needed: within a short dis-
tance of where the bulk of the residential growth is, like the Denny Tri-
angle.
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promote socio-economic and racial diversity by guaranteeing that new
neighborhoods attract people from all walks of life as the area transforms
into a residential space.
D. Reduce the Control Period
The City of Seattle should reduce the control period for affordable
housing units from fifty years to a more favorable variable control pe-
riod. The variable control period would apply only to units actually con-
structed on-site, while those units created via the fee-in-lieu of develop-
ment would remain permanently affordable. Suggesting a reduction in
the control period for affordable units will raise concerns from housing
advocates that a reduction in the control period will result in a corre-
sponding reduction in the affordable housing stock and thus completely
defeat the purpose of an inclusionary plan.
234 When inclusionary plans, however, encourage the consistent crea-
tion of new units, units that revert back to market-rate are simply re-
placed by an incoming supply of new affordable units. L ik e the effi-
ciency factor, the control period should be variable so that the city can
adjust it as the need for affordable housing waxes and wanes. For exam-
ple, the Seattle Office of Housing could make a quarterly control period
determination based on an evaluation of the current housing market, the
affordable housing stock, and other economic indicators that impact con-
struction. A  variable control period will allow the city to respond more
quickly and effectively to housing needs based on the rate of residential
development, rather than adhering to a rigid, arbitrary period. A  variable
control period may also encourage developers to undertake projects dur-
ing leaner economic times with the knowledge that the control period for
affordable units will be correspondingly reduced.
235 A reduced control period will also increase property values by cap-
ping the time market-rate unit values are suppressed because of the pres-
233. The downtown core and Belltown are other areas where the affordable housing units are
needed in Seattle.
234. Calavita, supra note 137, at 164.
235. A reduced control period would have particular appeal to residential developers and prop-
erty managers of rental units who could increase rents more quickly i f the control period for units
were reduced.
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ence of the inclusionary units within the broader market-rate develop-
ment. Reducing the control period will induce development of on-site
units as developers are better able to plan, price, and market the units to
buyers. I t  will also bolster development of residential rental units as lan-
dlords are better able to predict anticipated rents and plan for the tangible
increase in rents earned as affordable units are converted to market-rate
units.
The City of Seattle needs to make several immediate changes to its
inclusionary plan to maximize the creation of affordable housing units.
By moving to a mandatory plan that deemphasizes the fee-in-lieu of de-
velopment option and applies to all residential projects that exceed a
minimum size, more affordable housing units will be constructed in the
long term throughout the city. To defray some of the financial impacts
developers will face under the revised plan, Seattle should both increase
developer incentives for on-site construction and implement variable ef-
ficiency factors and control periods. These changes will effectively draw
Seattle towards its goal of achieving a spectrum of residential develop-
ment that is dense, varied, affordable, and profitable.
V. CONCLUSION
Not all inclusionary housing plans are created equal. Seattle's plan
focuses primarily on encouraging developers to voluntarily contribute
funds to an affordable housing pool. Consequentially, the more tradi-
tional notion of mandating on-site inclusionary units has fallen by the
wayside in Seattle. I n  contrast, San Francisco has a comprehensive
mandatory plan that seeks both to reach smaller developments and to
maximize the number of inclusionary units per project by making it more
costly for developers to undertake development off-site or via a payment
in lieu of development. O n the other hand, Denver has instituted a less
demanding mandatory plan that seeks inclusionary units only from larger
residential developments and then requires only that those inclusionary
units remain affordable for fifteen years.
An amended, improved inclusionary housing plan in Seattle is es-
sential to the long-term development of affordable housing units. T o
maximize results from the plan, Seattle must follow in the footsteps of
both San Francisco and Denver by mandating developer participation.
The city must move away from promoting the fee-in-lieu of development
option and must instead move towards on-site development. In  addition
to the existing density bonuses, the city should offer other incentives,
such as reimbursements and modifications to the control period for af-
fordable units, to make the transition to mandatory on-site development
more feasible for developers. Ultimately, a mandatory plan that offers
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broader incentives to developers will increase production of affordable
housing units within Seattle's expanding core; this, in turn, will generate
greater long-term density and affordability for  low- and moderate-
income residents, while ensuring continued profitability for Seattle's de-
velopers.
